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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE
ILLUSION OF COHERENCE
Richard L. Hasen*
The self-congratulatory tone of the majority and concurring opinions in last term’s controversial Supreme Court blockbuster,
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, extended beyond
the trumpeting of an absolutist vision of the First Amendment that
allows corporations to spend unlimited sums independently to support or oppose candidates for office. The triumphalism extended to
the majority’s view that it had imposed coherence on the unwieldy
body of campaign finance jurisprudence by excising an “outlier”
1990 opinion, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which
had upheld such corporate limits, and parts of a 2003 opinion,
McConnell v. FEC, extending Austin to unions and to a broader set
of election-related television and radio broadcasts. The majority
saw itself as returning the Court to the fountainhead of this jurisprudence, the Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. Citizens
United indisputably harmonized campaign finance law on the question of the constitutionality of spending limits on corporations, even
if its view of Austin as an “outlier” remains contested. But the
Court in doing so amplified and solidified other significant, incoherent aspects of its campaign finance jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article situates Citizens United in the campaign finance jurisprudence that preceded it and describes in detail the key
opinions in the case. Part II explains how the Court’s analysis in
Citizens United is likely to lead to new incoherence in the Court’s
campaign finance jurisprudence, because it is unlikely that the
Court will follow the new case to its extreme, for example to allow
spending by foreign nationals to influence candidate elections, to
treat spending in judicial elections the same way as spending for
other races, or to strike down reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to candidates. Part III suggests that
incoherence is likely to be an enduring feature of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, because consistent application of a
coherent approach could well be politically unpalatable for majority of the Justices on the Court. It also considers the challenge such
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School–Los Angeles.
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version of this Article at the 2010 American Political Science Association annual meeting in Washington, D.C.
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incoherence poses for lawyers arguing campaign finance cases in
the Supreme Court and lower courts.
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Introduction
The self-congratulatory tone of the majority and concurring opinions in
last term’s controversial Supreme Court blockbuster, Citizens United v.
1
FEC, extended beyond trumpeting an absolutist vision of the First Amendment that allows corporations to spend unlimited sums independently to
2
support or oppose candidates for office. The triumphalism extended to their
view that the majority had imposed coherence on the unwieldy body of
campaign finance jurisprudence by excising an “outlier” 1990 opinion, Aus-

1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Justice Kennedy wrote a majority opinion for five Justices on the
question of the constitutionality of limits on spending by corporations to influence candidate elections. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, wrote a second concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy spoke for
eight Justices (all except Justice Thomas) in upholding various campaign finance disclosure requirements. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the views of the “majority” of the Court in
this Article refer to the five-Justice majority on the corporate spending issue, not the eight-Justice
majority on the disclosure issue.
2. See, e.g., id. at 917 (“The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and
to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government
may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341
(2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part))); id. at 908 (“The
First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”); id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[Under the government’s position,] First Amendment rights could be confined to individuals,
subverting the vibrant public discourse that is at the foundation of our democracy.”); id. at 929
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal
agents of the modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this
speech to the public debate.”).
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3

tin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which had upheld such corporate
4
limits, and parts of a 2003 opinion, McConnell v. FEC, which extended
Austin to unions and to a broader set of election-related television and radio
5
broadcasts. The majority saw itself as returning the Court to the fountain6
head of this jurisprudence, the Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.
Citizens United indisputably harmonized campaign finance law pertaining to the constitutionality of spending limits on corporations, even if its
7
view of Austin as an outlier remains contested. But in doing so, the Court
amplified other significant, incoherent aspects of the its campaign finance
jurisprudence. In this regard, consider the Court’s declaration as an empirical matter—apparently for all types of elections and all types of spenders—
that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
8
appearance of corruption.” As part of its justification for this unsupported
9
empirical claim, the Court embraced a narrow, crabbed view of corruption.
This view is contrary to other precedent, including Buckley and other cases
upholding campaign contribution limits. Most notably, Citizens United ex10
cludes “[i]ngratiation and access” as possible forms of corruption, yet
these concepts are at the core of the Court’s decisions upholding contribution limitations. Consider also the Court’s declaration in Citizens United that
11
in the campaign finance context neither the identity of the speaker nor any

3.

494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990).

4.

540 U.S. 93, 126, 207 (2003).

5. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (calling Austin’s rationale an “aberration”
inconsistent with other Court precedent); id. at 903 (“The Court is thus confronted with conflicting
lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”); id. at 913 (“We return to the
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti . . . .”); id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[Austin]
was an ‘aberration’ insofar as it departed from the robust protections we had granted political speech
in our earlier cases.”); id. (“Austin undermined the careful line that Buckley drew. . . [and] was also
inconsistent with Bellotti[] . . . .”); id. (“Abrogating the errant precedent . . . might better preserve
the law’s coherence . . . .”). But see id. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“A third fulcrum of the Court’s opinion is the idea that Austin and McConnell are radical outliers,
‘aberration[s],’ in our First Amendment tradition. The Court has it exactly backwards. It is today’s
holding that is the radical departure from what had been settled First Amendment law.”) (citations
omitted). Justice Stevens used the term “outlier” five times in his dissenting opinion in describing
the majority’s view of Austin.
6.

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

7. For a contrary viewpoint on Austin’s status, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and Adam Winkler, McConnell v. FEC, Corporate
Political Speech, and the Legacy of the Segregated Fund Cases, 3 Election L.J. 361 (2004).
8.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.

9.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003).

10.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.

11. E.g., id. at 905 (“[T]he First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political
speech based on the speaker’s identity.”); id. at 902 (“[T]he Government cannot restrict political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”); id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant
reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a
speaker’s identity, including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.”).
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12

distortion of the political process caused by disproportionate spending can
ever be the basis to limit someone’s right to spend in elections.
This language will force the Court either to adopt a view that no limits
on money in politics are ever constitutional or, more likely, vote to sustain
some limits on money in politics through doctrinal incoherence. For example, it is unclear how, if the Court took its own broad pronouncements in
Citizens United seriously, it could possibly sustain spending limits against
foreign nationals and governments, who might seek to flood U.S. election
campaigns with money. Indeed, if the Court took its own language seriously
about the meaning of corruption, even normal limits on contributions to
candidates would be in serious danger of being struck down as a First
Amendment violation.
We need not wait for future cases to see this incoherence, however, because the Court’s new doctrine is already incoherent. The Citizens United
majority did not satisfactorily explain how independent expenditures—
which apparently cannot corrupt—were so corruptive, apparently corruptive,
13
or distorting of a judicial election in Caperton v. Massey that the Court
mandated the recusal of a state supreme court chief justice hearing a case
involving a corporate executive who had made large independent expendi14
tures supporting the chief justice’s election. The Citizens United majority
is not treating all elections and speakers equally in deed, even if it is in
word.
By criticizing the Court’s campaign finance doctrine as incoherent, I do
not mean to suggest that the Court could not or should not decide some
campaign finance questions in an inconsistent manner. That is, the Court
could develop coherent constitutional arguments justifying different treatment for campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, or for
campaign expenditures in judicial elections and other elections, or for the
treatment of foreign-initiated campaign spending on elections and spending
by domestic corporations. On the contribution-expenditure distinction, for
example, the Court could (and should) apply a single definition of corruption and impose on the state a single evidentiary burden for proving the
existence or appearance of corruption, and then judge the constitutionality
of contributions and expenditures under that single standard. As I show below, however, the Court has not done so. The Court’s jurisprudence instead
reads as though different courts have decided both its contribution and expenditure decisions. Instead of reconciling inconsistent standards for
judging constitutional questions in this arena, the Court ignores the contradictions. The Citizens United Court’s condemnation of Austin as a lone
15
“aberration” perniciously masks the regularity of its incoherence in the
campaign finance arena. Most importantly, the capacious rhetoric in Citizens
12.

See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.

13.

129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

14. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (purporting to distinguish Caperton); id. at 967
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Caperton is indistinguishable).
15.

See supra note 5.
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United will lead lower courts astray, as they take the Court’s reasoning and
dicta—not just its holding—as directions for how to resolve other campaign
finance cases.
The Court’s present and future incoherence in its campaign finance jurisprudence reveals a broader concern: the Court’s approach to
jurisprudential questions may be tempered by political sensibilities. As ex16
plained below, just as the Court before Citizens United treated corporations
and labor unions as subject to identical campaign finance regulation despite
the apparent inapplicability of the Austin antidistortion rationale to labor
unions, it is likely to treat foreigners and American citizens wishing to make
campaign expenditures differently despite the uniformity of the rhetoric of
free speech rights in Citizens United. This analysis suggests that the Court’s
jurisprudence, while certainly shifting toward a deregulatory direction, may
not move to complete deregulation unless the Court is willing to endure continued public backlash. At least in the campaign finance context, it may be
that the Court’s doctrine is bounded at its extremes by public opinion.
Part I of this Article situates Citizens United in the campaign finance jurisprudence that preceded it and describes in detail the key opinions in the
case. Part II explains how the Court’s analysis in Citizens United is likely to
lead to new incoherence in the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence because it is unlikely that the Court will follow the new case to its extreme—
for example to allow spending by foreign nationals to influence candidate
elections, to treat spending in judicial elections the same way as spending
for other races, or to strike down reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to candidates. Part III suggests that incoherence is likely
to be an enduring feature of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence
because consistent application of a coherent approach could well be politically unpalatable for a majority of the Justices. It also considers the
challenge such incoherence poses for lawyers arguing campaign finance
cases in the Supreme Court and lower courts.
I. CITIZENS UNITED’S Place in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence
17

A. Campaign Finance Jurisprudence Before Citizens United

The fountainhead of modern U.S. campaign finance jurisprudence is the
18
Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. The tensions in Buckley have
reverberated over the decades as the Court has been, by turns, deferential to
and skeptical of legislative decisions to limit campaign financing. Buckley’s
16.

See infra notes 246–247 and accompanying text.

17. I have canvassed this area before in some of my earlier writings. For my most recent
analysis of this area, see Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1064 (2008) [hereinafter Hasen, Beyond
Incoherence]; Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance By the Roberts
Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181 [hereinafter Hasen, Avoidance]; Richard L. Hasen, What the Court
Did—and Why, The Am. Int., July/Aug. 2010, at 49.
18.

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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tension is unsurprising given that it was drafted by a committee of Justices
who did not agree on the fundamental issue of how to balance First
19
Amendment rights of free speech and association with state interests. In its
most important compromise, the Court held that campaign contributions
20
could be limited to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, but
limits on spending could not be justified by those same interests due to a
lack of evidence that independent spending could corrupt candidates. The
Court wrote, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
21
candidate.” In addition, the Court rejected an equality rationale for limits,
holding that the concept that some voices could be limited to enhance the
22
voice of others to be “wholly foreign” to the First Amendment. The Court
also recognized a difference on the rights side of the balance: limits on the
amount of contributions only “marginally” restricted First Amendment
rights, which are to be judged under lower, “exacting scrutiny.” In contrast,
spending limits were subject to strict scrutiny because they limited speech
23
more directly.
Since Buckley, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence has swung
like a pendulum toward and away from deference, as Court personnel
24
changed and as Justices (occasionally) voted inconsistently. Throughout
these shifts between deference and deregulation, however, the Court had not
formally overturned any of its campaign finance precedents until Citizens
United.
Despite Buckley’s holding that lower, “exacting scrutiny” applied to re25
view of contribution limits, the Court held that limits on contributions to a
local ballot measure committee were unconstitutional because the anticor26
ruption interest did not apply to incorruptible ballot measures. In the
2000s, as the Court entered its period of greatest deference, it upheld in
19. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 Election L.J.
241, 241 (2003).
20.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28–29.

21. Id. at 47. The Court continued, “Rather than preventing the circumvention of the contribution limitations [the federal law limiting individual independent expenditures] severely restricts
all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished potential for abuse.” Id. It then noted
that “the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in
stemming the reality or appearance of corruption.” Id. at 47–48.
22.

Id. at 48–49.

23.

Id. at 19–20, 44–51.

24. For example, Justice O’Connor changed her position on the constitutionality of spending
limits imposed on corporations three times while on the Court. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, et
al., Election Law: Cases and Materials 843, 852 (4th ed. 2008).
25.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35, 44.

26. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299–300 (1981)
(“Whatever may be the state interest . . . in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures
of a candidate[,] . . . there is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion
of a ballot measure.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1620576

HASEN FTP5 B.DOC

February 2011]

12/6/2010 1:39:33 PM

Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence

587

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC a $1,075 contribution limit in
Missouri state elections against a challenge that the amount was too low for
27
challengers to mount an effective campaign. The Court did so even though
the $1,075 limit was much lower in 1976 dollars than the value of the
28
$1,000 limit upheld in Buckley.
Soon after Shrink Missouri, the Court abruptly changed course when
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor. The Court in Randall v. Sorrell held that Vermont’s campaign contribution limits were unconstitutionally low because they did not
give challengers enough resources for meaningful competition in competi29
tive elections. Moving in the same direction, the Roberts Court in Davis v.
FEC, relying on Buckley’s rejection of the equality rationale for campaign
finance regulation, struck down a provision of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law giving U.S. House candidates the right to collect
increased individual contributions for their campaigns when they faced a
30
self-financed opponent spending large sums.
The Court’s jurisprudence has vacillated on the spending side as well. In
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court followed Buckley’s rejection of individual spending limits in candidate elections and struck down
31
limits on spending by corporations in ballot measure elections. Though the
Court took an expansive view of corporate free speech rights, it added an
important footnote, footnote 26, stating that “Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in inde32
pendent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”
Footnote 26 stood in tension with Buckley’s statement that independent
spending by individuals cannot corrupt candidates because of the absence of
the possibility of a quid pro quo.
Eight years later, the Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc. (“MCFL”) first confronted the question of corporate spending limits in
candidate elections. The MCFL Court held that nonprofit, ideological corporations (later known as “MCFL corporations”) that do not take corporate
or labor union money cannot be limited in spending their treasury funds in
33
candidate elections. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the
Court more directly addressed the question left open by Bellotti’s footnote
26, upholding electoral spending limits on for-profit corporations in candi34
date elections. The Court did not address Bellotti’s suggestion that
27.

528 U.S. 377, 382–83, 397–98 (2000).

28.

See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 382, 395–97.

29.

548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006).

30.

128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008).

31.

435 U.S. 765, 767–70, 795 (1978).

32. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (“[O]ur consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on
issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office.”).
33.

479 U.S. 238, 241, 263 (1986).

34.

494 U.S. 652, 654–55, 668–69 (1990).
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corporate limits might be justified to prevent the corruption of candidates.
Instead, the Court held the law was justified to prevent “a different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support
35
for the corporation’s political ideas.”
36
Though cast as an “anti-corruption” rationale, Austin’s emphasis on
preventing “distort[ion]” of the electoral process through large corporate
37
spending suggested the Court in fact was espousing an equality rationale,
which it had rejected with respect to individuals in Buckley.
38
The Court retreated even further from Bellotti in FEC v. Beaumont, another case from its deferential post-2000 period. The Court in Beaumont
wrote that “corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political
expression, since corporations’ First Amendment speech and association
interests are derived largely from those of their members, and of the public
39
in receiving information.” The Court added that “[a] ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make
their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material in40
formation.”
The latest struggle over corporate spending limits began when Congress
passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA,” popularly
41
known as “McCain-Feingold”). The BCRA aimed to strengthen what its
supporters characterized as “loopholes” in existing campaign finance law.
Its “electioneering communications” provision was one of the most significant provisions.
Federal law, like the Michigan state law at issue in Austin, barred corporations and unions from spending general treasury funds on certain
42
election-related activities. The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”)
blessed the political action committee (“PAC”) alternative: corporations
and unions could establish separate political committees to spend money
on these campaigns, but these PACs were limited in both the amount that
could be contributed to candidates and who could be solicited to contribute.
The general treasury fund limitation proved ineffective, thanks to an in43
terpretation of the statute by the Court in Buckley. The Buckley Court held
35.

Id. at 660.

36.

Id.

37.

Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law 111–14 (2003).

38.

539 U.S. 146 (2003).

39.

Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 n.8 (citations omitted).

40.
41.
2005).

Id.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 101, 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (2000 & Supp. V

42.

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).

43.

See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003).
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that, to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems within the FECA, its
provisions should be interpreted to reach only election-related activity con44
taining “express advocacy,” like “Vote against Jones.” “Issue ads,” paid for
by corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals, began appearing in
the 1990s. These ads appeared to be aimed at influencing federal elections,
but they escaped FECA regulation through avoidance of express advocacy.
“Call Senator Jones and tell her what you think of her lousy vote on the stimulus bill” went unregulated, even though the person running the ad
certainly wanted to defeat Senator Jones for reelection. Spending on such
45
ads skyrocketed in the 1990s.
The BCRA responded to the issue-advocacy problem through the electioneering communications provision. Electioneering communications are
television or radio (not print or internet) advertisements that feature a candidate for federal election; they are capable of reaching 50,000 people in the
relevant electorate 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general
election. The definition applied to both disclosure rules and spending limitations. Under § 201, anyone making electioneering communications over a
certain dollar threshold must disclose contributions funding the ads and
46
spending related to the ads to the Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”).
In addition, under § 203 corporations and unions could not fund such ads
47
from general treasury funds, but had to rely on their PACs.
In McConnell v. FEC, the Court upheld, on a 5–4 vote, § 203 of the
48
BCRA against facial challenge. Reaffirming Austin, the McConnell Court
upheld the rules because most of the ads covered by the statute were “the
49
functional equivalent of express advocacy.” The Court upheld the provision
against labor unions, too, without explaining how labor unions could distort
50
the political process like corporations.
As with the contribution limits cases, the Court’s spending limits cases
shifted dramatically when Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (“WRTL I”), decided as Justice O’Connor
was retiring, the Court held that McConnell did not prevent a corporation or
union from bringing an as-applied challenge to § 203 on the basis that its
44.

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 n.51 (1976) (per curiam).

45.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126–27.

46.

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1).

47. Id. § 441b(b)(2). The Court later interpreted § 203 so as not to apply to MCFL corporations. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 210–11.
48.

540 U.S. at 207–09.

49. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206. By an 8–1 vote, the Court also upheld BCRA §§ 201 and
311 against a facial challenge. Id. at 201–02, 231.
50. Id. at 206; see also Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev.
31, 56–57 (2004) [hereinafter Hasen, Buckley is Dead] (discussing McConnell’s treatment of unions); Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s Emerging Egalitarian, 1 Alb.
Gov’t L. Rev. 169, 191–92 (2008) [hereinafter Hasen, Justice Souter] (discussing Justice Souter’s
treatment of labor unions in his dissent in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449
(2007)).
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51

ads were not “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” WRTL I concerned an electioneering communication discussing Wisconsin Senators
Feingold and Kohl’s position on judicial filibusters. The group wanted to
broadcast the ad in Wisconsin during Senator Feingold’s reelection campaign. The case returned to the Supreme Court after the lower court, on
remand, held that the ads were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and therefore were not entitled to an as-applied exemption.
In another 5–4 vote, the Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
52
(“WRTL II”) reversed the lower court. Three Justices in the majority (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas), echoing their dissenting opinions in McConnell,
took the position that § 203 was unconstitutional as applied to any corporate
53
spending. They contended that McConnell and Austin should be overruled.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito wrote a narrower (and therefore controlling) opinion, which did not reach the question whether McConnell and
Austin should be overruled. They instead concluded that the only corporatefunded advertisements that the BCRA could constitutionally bar were those
54
that were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” and they read
“functional equivalency” very narrowly.
More specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito determined
that in making the functional equivalency determination, one must consider
whether, without regard to context (such as the fact that the filibuster issue
was one that conservatives were using to attack liberal Democrats) and
without detailed discovery of the advertisers’ intentions, an advertisement
that was susceptible of “no reasonable interpretation” other than as an ad55
vertisement supporting or opposing a candidate for office. Otherwise, it
would be unconstitutional to apply § 203 to bar corporate funding for an
election-related advertisement.
Applying this new test, the controlling opinion held that the WRTL ad
was not the functional equivalent of an express advocacy against Senator
Feingold; it did not mention Senator Feingold’s character or fitness for office, and had no other clear indicia of the functional equivalent of express
56
advocacy. The new functional equivalency test appeared likely to eviscer57
ate § 203.

51.

546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006) (per curiam).

52.

551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007).

53. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483–504 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia was quite critical of the limited nature of the controlling opinion, calling it
“faux judicial restraint” that was “judicial obfuscation.” Id. at 498 n.7.
54.

Id. at 454–82 (principal opinion).

55.

Id. at 469–70.

56.

Id. at 470, 480–81.

57. See Hasen, Beyond Incoherence, supra note 17, at 1096. Because the Court in Citizens
United mooted application of the WRTL II “no reasonable interpretation” test before it was used in a
few elections, we do not know definitively how it would have worked in practice as construed by the
courts and the FEC.
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B. Citizens United
1. The Background
Though Citizens United ultimately brought down Austin and part of
McConnell, the case did not begin as such an audacious challenge. Like
WRTL II, Citizens United began as a suit to weaken existing campaign fi58
nance precedent. Citizens United, a nonprofit ideological corporation that
59
accepted some for-profit corporate funding, produced a feature-length do60
cumentary entitled Hillary: The Movie. Though the documentary was
available in theaters and on DVD during the 2008 primary season, Citizens
United also wished to distribute the movie through a cable television “video-on-demand” service. Citizens United wanted to use its general treasury
funds to pay a $1.2 million fee to a cable television operator consortium to
make the documentary available for free download by cable subscribers “on
61
demand.”
The documentary contained no express advocacy but, unlike the WRTL
II ad, it did contain a great many negative statements about a candidate for
62
office, including a statement that the candidate, Hillary Clinton, was a “Eu63
ropean socialist” not fit to be commander in chief. The FEC argued that the
64
documentary met WRTL II’s functional equivalency test. Though the
65
group’s PAC had ample resources, it did not wish to pay for the broadcasts
with its own funds.
Citizens United filed suit against the FEC under a special jurisdictional
66
provision of the BCRA. It made a motion for a preliminary injunction to
58. Matthew Mosk, Citizens United v. the FEC: The Return of Corporate Influence Peddling?, ABC News (Jan. 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/citizens-united-fec-returncorporate-influence-peddling/story?id=9545153&page=1. Both cases were litigated by Jim Bopp.
Ted Olson took over as Citizens United’s lawyer when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
Id.
59. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). By taking some for-profit corporate
money, the corporation appeared ineligible for the MCFL exemption.
60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 n.4 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court)
(per curiam) (television advertisement quoting Dick Morris from the movie stating that “Hillary is
the closest thing we have in America to a European socialist”).
64. Brief for Appellee, No. 08-205, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellee.pdf. Citizens United
also wanted to broadcast some ten-second and thirty-second advertisements promoting the documentary without complying with some BCRA disclosure provisions, including § 201 (requiring
disclosure of funders) and § 311 (requiring the “disclaimer” stating who paid for the advertisement
and that it was not approved by any candidate or committee).
65. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC)
with millions of dollars in assets.”).
66. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 403, 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (2000 & Supp. V
2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
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67

allow it to pay for the on-demand cable broadcast of its documentary. The
68
court unanimously rejected Citizens United’s arguments. It held that the
documentary satisfied WRTL II’s functional equivalency test and therefore
69
Citizens United was not entitled to an as-applied exemption. Citizens United appealed from the denial of the preliminary injunction to the Supreme
70
Court. After the Court dismissed the appeal, the case returned to the dis71
trict court, which then granted summary judgment for the FEC.
72
Back in the Supreme Court, Citizens United advanced numerous arguments, both statutory and constitutional. Most narrowly, it argued that the
FEC regulations should not be construed to apply to video-on-demand cable
73
broadcasts. Most broadly, it argued that Austin was wrongly decided and
74
should be overruled.
75
The case was first argued in March of 2009, and at this point its broader significance became clear. The deputy solicitor general had trouble
answering a hypothetical question about the regulation of books containing
“the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Many of the Justices at oral
argument expressed alarm that Congress might have the power to ban books
76
on election-related issues. Rather than issue an opinion in the case, on the
last regular day of its term in June 2009, the Court announced a rehearing of
the case for September. The Court asked for supplemental briefing on the
following question:
For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or
both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and
the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),

67. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 275. It also sought to bar enforcement of BCRA
§§ 201’s and 311’s disclosure requirements as to the advertisements. Id. at 277.
68.

Id. at 275.

69. Id. at 279–80. As to the advertisements, the district court held that the WRTL II exemption did not apply to the disclosure rules, relying on language in McConnell broadly upholding these
requirements. Id. at 281.
70.

Citizens United v. FEC, 552 U.S. 1278 (2008).

71. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008)
(three-judge court).
72.

Citizens United v. FEC, 552 U.S. 1240 (2008).

73. Brief for Appellant at 26 n.2, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08205), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellant.pdf.
74.

Id. at 30 (“Austin was wrongly decided and should be overruled.”).

75. Transcript of Oral Argument, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf.
76. Adam Liptak, Justices Consider Interplay Between First Amendment and Campaign Finance Laws, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2009, at A16, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D8113EF936A15750C0A96F9C8B63 (“Several of the court’s more
conservative justices reacted with incredulity to a series of answers from a government lawyer about
the scope of Congressional authority to limit political speech. The lawyer, Malcolm L. Stewart, said
Congress has the power to ban political books, signs and Internet videos, if they are paid for by
corporations and distributed not long before an election.”).
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which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Cam77
paign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b?
78

The Court reheard argument in September 2009.
2. The Opinions

79

a. The Majority Opinion

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion began with some significant brush
clearing. The Court rejected arguments to resolve Citizens United’s complaint
against corporate spending limits on statutory grounds or to issue a narrow
80
constitutional ruling. The Court also rejected extending the MCFL
exemption to nonprofit corporations who take some corporate or labor union

77.

Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (parallel citations omitted).

78. Transcript of Oral Reargument, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No.
08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205%
5BReargued%5D.pdf.
79. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion on the corporate spending limits question for
himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
886–917. All those Justices besides Justice Thomas, as well as all the Justices dissenting on the
spending limits issue, concurred with Part IV of Kennedy’s opinion upholding Citizen United’s
challenges against the BCRA disclosure provisions. Id. at 913–16. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a
concurrence for himself and Justice Alito, addressing arguments related to constitutional avoidance
and stare decisis. Id. at 917–25 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito
and in part by Justice Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion addressing arguments as to the original
understanding of the First Amendment. Id. at 925–29 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, for
himself and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented on the spending limits question. Id.
at 929–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. The Court first rejected the nonconstitutional argument that video-on-demand cable
broadcasts, or at least this instance of their use, were not covered by the FEC regulation or underlying statute. Id. at 888–89. The majority also rejected the related argument that the corporate
spending limit “should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand [on
grounds] that this delivery system has a lower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads.” Id. at 890. Such an approach “would raise questions as to the courts’ own lawful authority
. . . [a]nd in all events, those differentiations might soon prove to be irrelevant or outdated by technologies that are in rapid flux.” Id. Moreover, the Court found such an approach in violation of the
First Amendment because “[t]he interpretive process itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, and
serious risk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end,
would themselves be questionable.” Id. at 891.
The Court then quickly rejected the argument that the documentary was not the “functional
equivalent of express advocacy” under the WRTL II exemption: “The movie, in essence, is a featurelength negative advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton for President.” Id.
at 890. One of the great ironies here, unacknowledged by the Court, is the ease with which the Court
was able to apply Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling WRTL II test of functional equivalence, despite
skepticism expressed by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in WRTL II that the test was too
vague to be applied:
There is a fundamental and inescapable problem with all of these various tests. Each of them
(and every other test that is tied to the public perception, or a court’s perception, of the import,
the intent, or the effect of the ad) is impermissibly vague and thus ineffective to vindicate the
fundamental First Amendment rights of the large segment of society to which § 203 applies.

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 492 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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money but whose “political speech [is] funded overwhelmingly by
81
individuals.”
On the merits, the Court began its discussion by defending its characterization of federal law as a “ban” on corporate political speech, rejecting
the argument that the law merely imposed a requirement that non-MCFL
corporations use PAC funds rather than general treasury funds for electionrelated communications. The Court stated that a PAC does not “allow a cor82
poration to speak,” and PACs are “burdensome alternatives [that] are
83
expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.” Having
found the law’s “prohibition on corporate independent expenditures . . . a
84
ban on speech,” the Court explained the First Amendment interests at
stake: “Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could
repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the
85
speech process.” Recognizing political speech as central to the First
Amendment, the Court stated that the law would have to survive strict scru86
tiny.
The First Amendment, “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,
. . . stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
87
allowing speech by some but not others.” A government decision to privilege some speakers over others “deprive[s] the public of the right and
privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the
88
ideas that flow from each.”
The Court then canvassed its pre-Austin caselaw on the topic of corpo89
rate spending in elections, including Buckley and Bellotti. It stated that

81. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. While acknowledging that “the Court should construe
statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the series of steps suggested would be difficult to take in view of the language of the statute.” Id. at 892. The Court declined “to adopt an
interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is
banned, especially” because the Court was convinced that “this corporation has a constitutional right
to speak on this subject.” Id. The Court then launched into an extensive discussion as to why the
Court was going to strike down the statute “facially” (that is, unconstitutional for all corporations—
and presumably labor unions) rather than “as applied” (that is, unconstitutional just for Citizens
United and similar groups). Id. at 892–96.
82.

Id. at 897.

83.

Id.; see also id. at 897–98 (describing PAC regulations).

84.

Id. at 898.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Id. (citation omitted).

88. Id. at 899. The Court distinguished cases in which speech would “interfere with governmental functions,” id., such as rules limiting the rights of government employees to participate in
elections.
89.

Id. at 899–903.
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90

prior caselaw contradicted Austin, and the question before the Court was
91
whether Austin should be overruled. It then turned to the three arguments
made in support of Austin: antidistortion, anticorruption, and shareholder
protection.
Antidistortion. Noting that the government “all but abandon[ed] reli92
ance” on Austin’s antidistortion interest, the Court strongly and
unequivocally rejected antidistortion as a permissible governmental interest.
The Court said that the interest could justify the banning of books, and constituted an equalization rationale inconsistent with Buckley, Davis, and other
93
cases. The special advantages that the state conferred on corporations, such
as limited liability and perpetual life, “do[] not suffice” for prohibiting
94
speech under the First Amendment, and it is irrelevant if the speech of cor95
porations has “little or no correlation” with public support. The Court stated
that the antidistortion rationale “would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political speech of media
96
corporations.” It concluded that Austin “permits the Government to ban the
political speech of millions of associations of citizens. . . . The censorship we
97
now confront is vast in its reach.” Austin was “all the more an aberration”
90. Id. at 903 (“The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin
line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a postAustin line that permits them.”).
91.

Id. at 888.

92. Id. At the time the government filed its supplemental brief, I noted the government’s
surprising failure to defend the Austin antidistortion rationale, and to recast it as an interest in shareholder protection. Rick Hasen, The Government’s Remarkable Supplemental Brief in Citizens
United: No Mention of Corporate “Distortion,” Election L. Blog (July 27, 2009, 9:37 AM),
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/014156.html. The question of whether this was a strategic error
reemerged when Solicitor General Kagan, who argued the second argument in Citizens United, was
nominated to be a Justice of the Supreme Court. Adam Liptak, Stints in Court May Yield Clues to a
Style, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/15/us/politics/15scotus.html; see also Robert Barnes, In Elena Kagan’s work as solicitor general,
few clues to her views, Wash. Post, May 13, 2010, at A03, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/12/AR2010051205049.html; Jess Bravin,
Kagan and Key Case: The Jury Is Out, Wall St. J., May 12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703565804575238691604135782.html; Adam Liptak, On Speech,
Kagan Leaned Toward Conservatives, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2010, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/politics/16court.html.
93.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.

94.

Id. at 905.

95.

Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).

96.

Id. Among other arguments, the Court stated that:

[E]ven assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization has a right to speak
when others do not, the exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall
business interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical business interest
but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This differential treatment cannot be squared with the First
Amendment.

Id. at 906. The Court further stated that such a view has “no support” as the First Amendment was
“originally understood.” Id.
97.

Id. at 906–07.
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98

because the law included both small and nonprofit corporations, neither of
which had vast accumulations of wealth.
Anticorruption. The Court then rejected the argument that a corporate
spending limit could be justified on anticorruption grounds. It cited portions
99
of Buckley rejecting a similar argument, and brushed aside the fact that
Bellotti’s footnote 26 left the issue open: “For the reasons explained above,
we now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corrup100
tion.” The Court then distinguished FEC v. National Right to Work
Committee (“NRWC”), which held that a nonprofit corporation could be
101
limited in terms of whom it could solicit for contributions to its PAC. The
Court in NRWC, relying on the Bellotti footnote, “did say that there is a
‘sufficient’ governmental interest’ in ‘ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed’ by corporations would not ‘be used to incur
102
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions.’ ” The
Court stated that NRWC has “little relevance here,” because the case “involved contribution limits, which, unlike limits on independent
expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corrup103
tion.”
The Court then explained its understanding of the meaning of the term
“corruption.” “When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that
104
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.” The Court quoted Justice
105
Kennedy’s partial dissent in McConnell for the proposition that “[t]he fact
that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not
106
mean [they] are corrupt.” “Favoritism and influence” are unavoidable in
representative politics, and a “substantial and legitimate reason” to cast a
vote or make a contribution to one candidate or another “is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter
98.

See id. at 907.

99.

Id. at 908.

100. Id. at 909. The Court stated that the Bellotti footnote was “supported only by a law review student comment, which misinterpreted Buckley.” Id.
101.

459 U.S. 197 (1982).

102.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 559–60).

103. Id. (citations omitted). The Court further explained that “Citizens United has not made
direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether
contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. Moreover, the
Court, in explaining Buckley’s holding that contribution limitations could be imposed to prevent
quid pro quo corruption, explained that “restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements. The Buckley
Court nevertheless sustained limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or
appearance of corruption.” Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
104.

Id. at 909.

105. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
106.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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107

favors.” The Court further stated that “[t]he appearance of influence or
access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy,” and
independent spending which is uncoordinated with a candidate cannot give
rise to an appearance of corruption because the additional political speech
simply seeks to persuade voters who have “the ultimate influence over
108
elected officials.”
The Court concluded the discussion of the anticorruption argument by
distinguishing the Caperton case as “limited to the rule that the judge [who
benefited from significant spending on his behalf] must be recused, not that
109
the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” It also stated that the extensive record in McConnell “confirms Buckley’s reasoning that independent
expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo cor110
ruption.” The Court stated the record showed “scant evidence that
independent expenditures even ingratiate. Ingratiation and access, in any
111
event, are not corruption.” The Court concluded that it would be a “cause
for concern” “[i]f elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they
112
put expediency before principle.” Though the Court must “give weight to
attempts by Congress . . . to dispel either the appearance or the reality of
these influences,” the remedy “must comply with the First Amendment,”
and an “outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical pree113
lection period is not a permissible remedy.”
Shareholder protection. Though the government put most of its eggs in114
to the shareholder protection basket, the Court disposed of the argument in
two short paragraphs. First, the Court said, the argument was an impermissible basis to limit corporate spending because, like the antidistortion
argument, it would allow the government to apply the ban to media corpora115
tions. There was also “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
116
shareholders” through corporate democracy. The statute also suffered
from being underinclusive in serving the shareholder protection interest,
because it covered certain media ads in the short period before the election,

107. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.

Id. (citations omitted)

112. Id. at 911. The Court did not explain why elected officials could succumb to improper
influences from independent expenditures if such expenditures have no potential to corrupt.
113.

Id.

114.

See supra note 92.

115.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.

116.

Id.
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and overinclusive, because it covered nonprofit and for-profit corporations
117
with single shareholders.
Following the rejection of the three potential government interests, the
Court concluded by quickly noting that it did not reach the question “whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign
individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political proc118
ess.” It then argued that principles of stare decisis did not prevent
119
overruling Austin: Austin “was not well reasoned,” the government failed
120
to “defend[] the reasoning of a precedent,” the case was “undermined by
121
experience” in circumventing the restriction, and “[n]o serious reliance
122
interests are at stake.” Given the Court’s conclusion that Austin must be
overruled, it followed that the Court overruled that part of McConnell up123
holding the BCRA’s § 203.
In the final substantive part of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy,
joined by all of the Justices of the Court besides Justice Thomas, rejected
Citizens United’s challenges to the BCRA’s § 311, requiring that televised
electioneering communications include a disclaimer stating who was responsible for the content of the advertisement, and to § 201, requiring
disclosure by anyone spending more that $10,000 on electioneering com124
munications in a calendar year. The Court stated that these rules impose
125
“no ceiling on campaign-related activities” and could be justified by the
government’s “sufficiently important” interest in providing the electorate
126
with information about the sources of election-related spending. “The
Court has explained that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more
127
comprehensive regulations of speech.” It reiterated that those facing the
potential for harassment from disclosure are free to bring an as-applied chal-

117. Id. For an argument that Congress or state legislatures should pass new rules limiting
corporate political spending without shareholder approval, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (2010).
118.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.

119.

Id. at 912.

120.

Id.

121.

Id.

122.

Id. at 913.

123.

Id.

124.

Id. at 913–16.

125.

Id. at 914 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)).

126. Id. The Court rejected the arguments that disclosure was unjustified for commercial
advertisements (e.g., advertising the movie), that the disclosure law was underinclusive because it
did not cover print or media advertising, and that the disclosure law could be limited to ads which
are the functional equivalent of direct advocacy. On this latter point, the Court stated, “Even if the
ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking
about a candidate shortly before an election.” Id. at 915. The Court’s statement that “the informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of § 201 to these ads,” id. at 915–16, and its
approval of disclosure requirements applied to lobbying activities, id. at 915, together mean the
Court is likely to uphold a variety of broad disclosure provisions against constitutional challenge.
127.

Id.
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lenge, but noted that Citizens United “has offered no evidence that its mem128
bers may face . . . threats or reprisals.”
b. The Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia each wrote concurring opin129
ions. The Chief Justice’s opinion was devoted exclusively to defending the
majority’s decision against charges that the Court acted immodestly in deciding the case. The opinion began by stating fidelity to the avoidance
canon, and noted that the Court applied it in Northwest Austin Municipal
130
Utility District Number One v. Holder (“NAMUDNO”), the term prior so
131
as to avoid striking down a major portion of the Voting Rights Act. It
stated, however, that there was no principled statutory way to resolve the
132
case in Citizens United’s favor, nor a way to decide the constitutional
133
question narrowly through the use of an as-applied challenge.
According to the Chief Justice, stare decisis should not prevent overruling Austin. He disagreed with the notion that cases relying on Austin
134
constituted cases “reaffirming” Austin because “[n]ot a single party in any
135
of those cases asked us to overrule Austin.” “Abrogating the errant precedent . . . might better preserve the law’s coherence and curtail the
136
precedent’s disruptive effects.” Austin was “errant” because it contradicted
Buckley’s rejection of the equalization rationale and Bellotti’s rejection of
limits on free speech rights of corporations. Moreover, Austin’s rationale is
“uniquely destabilizing” because its equalization rationale could affect
137
Court decisions outside the campaign finance area. He criticized the dissent for rejecting the argument that Austin offered an equalization rationale,
138
“a point that most scholars acknowledge (and many celebrate).” He stated
that “[a] speaker’s ability to persuade . . . provides no basis for government

128. Id. at 916. The Court reiterated the centrality of as-applied challenges in dealing with the
threat of harassment in Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010), a case it decided later in 2010.
129. The Chief Justice’s opinion is the more important one for the purposes of this Article.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence addressed itself to the “original understanding” of the First Amendment, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring), taking strong issue with the
dissent’s claim that the Framers of the Constitution would have approved of corporate spending
limits in candidate elections, id. at 925–29.
130.

129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).

131.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

132.

Id.

133.

Id. at 919.

134.

Id. at 919–20.

135. Id. at 920; see also id. (“[A]s the dissent points out, the Court generally does not consider constitutional arguments that have not properly been raised.” (citation omitted)).
136.

Id. at 921.

137.

Id. at 922.

138.

Id.
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139

regulation of free and open public debate on what the laws should be.”
“Finally and most importantly” was the government’s own failure to defend
140
Austin’s rationale: “to the extent the Government relies on new arguments—and declines to defend Austin on its own terms—we may
reasonably infer that it lacks confidence in that decision’s original justifica141
tion.”
142

c. The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Stevens, for the four dissenters on the corporate spending limits
143
question, issued a lengthy dissenting opinion. He began with two sections
addressing why the Court should have decided the case on narrower statu144
tory grounds, as well as why the Court should have affirmed Austin under
145
principles of stare decisis. He concluded that “[e]ach of the [narrower]
139. Id. at 923. Like the majority, the Chief Justice stressed the application of Austin to media
corporations. Id.
140. Id. The Chief Justice explained that the Austin majority opinion relied on neither the
threat of quid pro quo corruption nor the need for shareholder protection. Id. at 924.
141.

Id.

142. I focus here solely on Justice Stevens’s dissent. Justice Thomas dissented for himself
alone on the constitutionality of the disclosure and disclaimer provisions. Id. at 979–82 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Consistent with his views in earlier cases, see Richard L.
Hasen, Justice Thomas: leading the way to campaign-finance deregulation, First Amendment
Center (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=18958, Justice
Thomas stated that the First Amendment contains a right to anonymous speech that cannot be overcome by a government interest in providing information to the electorate, particularly given the
potential chill on First Amendment activity caused by disclosure of campaign-related speech over
the internet. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 981–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He made the same points in Doe v. Reed later in the term. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2844–47 (2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. The opinion runs fifty pages in the Supreme Court Reporter. Justice Stevens even apologized for the length of the dissent: “I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and
novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. On the first point, Justice Stevens argued that the issue of overruling Austin was not
properly before the Court, because a facial challenge was abandoned in the lower court and the issue
was not presented in the jurisdictional statement to the Court. Id. at 931–32. “Our colleagues’ suggestion that ‘we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell,’ would be more accurate if
rephrased to state that ‘we have asked ourselves’ to consider those cases.” Id. at 931 (citation omitted). He then argued that the case should have been adjudicated as an as-applied, rather than facial,
challenge, id. at 933–36, noting that the facial challenge allowed the Court to adjudicate the issues
in the case, including the question whether the spending limits were justified on anticorruption
grounds, without giving the government the opportunity to develop evidence on the question in the
lower courts, id. at 933.
Justice Stevens then discussed three ways the Court could have decided the case on narrower
grounds: that video-on-demand is not covered by § 203, id. at 937; that the MCFL exemption should
be expanded to cover nonprofit corporations that take a de minimis amount of money from corporations, id.; and that Citizens United’s feature length film “look[ed] so unlike the types of electoral
advocacy Congress has found deserving of regulation” that the group was entitled to an as-applied
constitutional exemption, id. at 938.
145. On this point, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s assertions that Austin was
poorly reasoned and that it was undermined by experience. On the latter point, the dissent stated that
“[t]he majority has no empirical evidence with which to substantiate the claim.” Id. at 939. Federal,
state, and local governments relied on Austin in crafting their campaign finance laws, id. at 940, and
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arguments made above is surely at least as strong as the statutory argument
146
the Court accepted in last year’s Voting Rights Act case, [NAMUDNO].”
On the merits, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s repeated insistence that the PAC requirement “banned” political speech, calling the
147
characterization “highly misleading, and need[ing] to be corrected.” The
148
idea that corporate speech would be banned is “nonsense.” Justice Stevens
defended the media exemption, noting the “unique role played by the insti149
tutional press in sustaining public debate.”
The dissent rejected the “identity-based” distinctions of the majority,
noting that in the election context, laws ban political activities of foreigners
150
and government employees. It then turned to the “original understand151
152
ings” of the First Amendment, the pre-Austin campaign finance cases,
153
and the post-Austin cases which “reaffirmed” its holding. The dissent also
disagreed with the majority’s reading of Buckley and Bellotti, stating that
Austin did not conflict with Buckley’s rejection of the equalization ration154
ale, and noting that Bellotti footnote 26 expressly left the anticorruption
155
rationale open as to corporate spending limits in candidate elections.
the Court’s contrary ruling “makes a hash” out of the BCRA’s regulatory scheme, weakening parties
by strengthening outside groups, id.
146. Id. at 938 n.16. Chief Justice Roberts called the dissent’s views of these narrower
grounds “quite perplexing” because the dissenters “presumably agree[] with the majority that Citizens United’s narrower statutory and constitutional arguments lack merit—otherwise its conclusion
that the group should lose this case would make no sense.” Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
The dissent responded that there is “nothing perplexing about the matter” because the dissenters “do
not share [the majority’s] view of the First Amendment” and therefore there is no occasion “to practice constitutional avoidance or to vindicate Citizens United’s as-applied challenge.” Id. at 938 n.16
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One might add that the dissent likely wanted
to avoid the political optics of a 9–0 defeat for the government (albeit on vastly different grounds),
recalling the majority’s controversial statement in Bush v. Gore that “[s]even Justices of the Court
agree that there are constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court
that demand a remedy. The only disagreement is as to the remedy.” 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per
curiam) (citations omitted).
147.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

148.

Id. at 944.

149. Id. at 943; see also id. at 976 (discussing the role of the press and media exemption).
Justice Stevens added that “with a media corporation there is also a lesser risk that investors will not
understand, learn about, or support the advocacy messages that the corporation disseminates.” Id. at
943 n.32. He also stated that the majority “[r]oam[ed] far afield from the case at hand” by worrying
“that the government will use § 203 to ban books, pamphlets, and blogs.” Id. at 943 n.31.
150. Id. at 946–48. “Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate identity tend to be less
worrisome . . . because the ‘speakers’ are not natural persons, much less members of our political
community, and the governmental interests are of the highest order.” Id. at 947.
151.

Id. at 948–52.

152.

Id. at 952–56.

153.

Id. at 956–57.

154. Id. at 958. In Austin, the Court “expressly ruled that the compelling interest supporting
Michigan’s statute was not [the equalization rationale] but rather the need to confront the distinctive
corrupting potential of corporate electoral advocacy financed by general treasury dollars.” Id. (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 959 (“A referendum cannot owe a political debt to a corporation, seek to curry
favor with a corporation, or fear the corporation’s retaliation.”).
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Finally, the dissent turned to discuss the anticorruption, antidistortion, and
shareholder protection rationales.
Anticorruption. The dissent disagreed with the narrow view of corruption embraced by the majority: “[T]he difference between selling a vote and
156
selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.” Setting forth a broad view
of “undue influence” that could justify campaign finance regulations, the
dissent rejected the idea that Buckley compelled a conclusion that independ157
ent spending can never corrupt a candidate. It concluded that corporations
raised a special problem of quid pro quo corruption because corporations as
a class “tend to be more attuned to the complexities of the legislative process and more directly affected by tax and appropriations measures that
receive little public scrutiny; they also have vastly more money with which
158
to try to buy access and votes.” The dissent saw the majority’s rejection of
these arguments as inconsistent with its opinion the term before in Caper159
ton. The dissent also rejected arguments that Congress passed the law as a
160
means of incumbent self-protection.
Antidistortion. While acknowledging “that Austin can bear an egalitarian
161
reading,” the dissent disputed the claim that it was “just” an “ ‘equalizing’
162
ideal in disguise.” Instead, “[u]nderstood properly” the argument “is
simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting against
improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the democratic proc163
ess.” According to the dissent, corporations do not engage in self164
expression the way human beings do. In any case, some corporations
actually wanted limits on spending to prevent officeholders from “shak[ing]
156. Id. at 961. Justice Stevens discussed the evidence found by the district court in the
McConnell case that members of Congress were grateful for independent negative advertisements
run with corporate and labor union money. Further, groups running these ads received special consideration from grateful officials when matters arose that affected these corporations and
organizations. Id. at 961–62 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 623–24 (D.D.C.
2003)). He also added that even if ingratiation and access are not corruption, “they are necessary
prerequisites to it; they can create both the opportunity for, and the appearance of, quid pro quo
arrangements.” Id. at 965.
157. Id. at 964 (“[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does not presently appear to pose dangers of
real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions . . . .”
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam))). Despite stating that the majority
seemed to decide this issue with finality and without any empirical evidence, the dissent suggested
that a new version of § 203 might be “supported by additional evidence of quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance.” Id. at 978 n.76.
158. Id. at 965; see also id. (“Business corporations must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are to maximize shareholder value. The unparalleled resources, professional
lobbyists, and single-minded focus they bring to this effort . . . make quid pro quo corruption and its
appearance inherently more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend unrestricted
sums on elections.”).
159.

Id. at 967–68.

160.

Id. at 968–70.

161.

Id. at 971 n.69.

162. Id. at 970; see also id. at 971 n.69 (disagreeing with the Chief Justice that there is “nothing more to it” than equality).
163.

Id. at 970.

164.

Id. at 970–72.
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them down for supportive ads.” Finally, large corporate spending could
“marginalize[]” the opinions of “real people” by “drowning out . . . non166
corporate voices.” This in turn “can generate the impression that corpora167
tions dominate our democracy” and give corporations “special advantages
168
in the market for legislation.”
Shareholder protection. The dissent reasoned that the law can “serve
First Amendment values” by protecting the rights of shareholders from a
“kind of coerced speech: electioneering expenditures that do not reflec[t]
169
[their] support.” The PAC mechanism prevents managers from advancing
personal agendas, and limits the “rent seeking behavior of executives and
170
respects the views of dissenters.”
The Stevens dissent concluded by alluding to the troubled U.S. economy
in 2010 driven by corporate excess, declaring that it was “a strange time to
repudiate” the “common sense” of the American people dating back to
Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to fight “against the distinctive corrupting po171
tential of corporate electioneering.”
II. The Continued Incoherence of Campaign
Finance Jurisprudence After CITIZENS UNITED
The Citizens United opinions are full of fascinating empirical, doctrinal, and jurisprudential issues that are likely to keep legal scholars busy
172
for years, on issues ranging from constitutional avoidance to facial ver173
sus as-applied challenges to First Amendment theory to corporate

165.

Id. at 973.

166.

Id. at 974.

167. Id.; see also id. at 975–76 (“In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of the
airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints,
and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.”).
168. Id. at 975. The dissent stated that corporations are “uniquely equipped” to engage in this
“rent seeking.” See id.
169.

Id. at 977 (internal quotation marks omitted).

170.

Id.

171. Id. at 979. Bill Araiza, writing before the Court’s Citizens United decision, nicely situates
the case in the context of disputes over the economic marketplace. See William D. Araiza, Campaign Finance Regulation: the Resilience of the American Model, 2 Amsterdam L. F. 55 (2009),
available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/view/108.
172. Before the Court decided Citizens United, but after the Court set it for reargument, I
wrote a law review article contrasting the Court’s use of avoidance in NAMUDNO with its failure to
do so in Citizens United. See Hasen, Avoidance, supra note 17. Justice Stevens in his dissent also
noted the contrast in the Court’s treatment of avoidance in the two cases. See Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 938 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling the statutory arguments in Citizens United “at least as strong” as those accepted by the Court in NAMUDNO).
173. One issue is the majority’s discussion of the Press Clause. See Eugene Volokh, State
Attorneys General Argue that Non-Media Speakers Should Get Less First Amendment Protection than
Media Speakers, The Volokh Conspiracy (June 1, 2010 2:21 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/01/
state-attorneys-general-argue-that-non-media-speakers-should-get-less-first-amendment-protectionthan-media-speakers (arguing that Citizens United rejects special protections for institutional press).
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governance to the tax treatment of nonprofits. Even within campaign
finance scholarship, there is much to say, on issues ranging from campaign
176
finance disclosure to how corporate and labor union spending patterns in
177
elections may change in light of the decision, regarding the Justices’ di178
vergent treatment of the antidistortion interest.
My focus in this Article is limited to the question of the coherence of the
Citizens United majority’s approach, in light of both the earlier doctrinal
179
incoherence of the Court and the majority’s celebration of its own decision
180
as restoring coherence to campaign finance doctrine. The question of coherence is interesting for both doctrinal and theoretical reasons. Doctrinally,
it is important as the federal, state, and local governments attempt to rework
their campaign finance laws to comport with both the Citizens United decision and for the likely lower courts’ judicial reactions to that decision.
Theoretically, the continued incoherence of Supreme Court doctrine sheds
some light on the interaction of legal doctrine and the political legitimacy of
174. See The DISCLOSURE Act: Hearing on H.R. 5175 Before the Commm. on H. Admin.,
111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Professor John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of
Law and Economics, Harvard Law School), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604567; Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 117; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be
or Not to Be? Citizens United and the Corporate Form (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-005, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546087; Anne Tucker Nees, Politicizing Corporations: A Corporate
Law Analysis of Corporate Personhood and First Amendment Rights after Citizens United (Jan. 27,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1542063.
175. See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Wisconsin Right to Life and
Citizens United Invalidate Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity? (George Wash. Univ. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 499, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572511; Ellen Aprill, Regulating the Political
Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations after Citizens United (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
176. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 Election L.J. 273 (forthcoming Oct. 2010).
177. See Raymond J. La Raja, Will Citizens United v. FEC give more political power to corporations? (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642175.
178. As I hope to discuss in a future article, the dissent’s treatment of the antidistortion interest is the least coherent portion of the dissenting opinion. The dissent seems to simultaneously (1)
reject the argument that the antidistortion interest is (solely) an equality rationale; (2) defend the
argument as really about traditional corruption; and (3) mix equality and corruption concepts in
discussing how corporate speech can “drown out” other voices. More promising is the dissent’s
discussion of anti-extortion and anti-rent-seeking rationales for corporate spending limits.
Despite Justice Stevens recognizing in his dissent that he himself has endorsed the equalization rationale for campaign finance regulation more broadly, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
963 n.65 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the dissenting Justices chose
not to offer a full-throated defense of the rationale. This could well be due to the government’s
failure to defend the rationale, a point stressed by both the majority opinion and the Chief Justice’s
concurring opinion.
179. I have written three earlier articles exploring the Court’s doctrinal incoherence. See Hasen, Beyond Incoherence, supra note 17; Hasen, Buckley is Dead, supra note 50; Richard L. Hasen,
The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law
After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 849 (2007).
180.

See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
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the Court. This Part focuses on the doctrinal question, looking at issues related to spending limitations on foreigners, limitations in judicial elections,
and contribution limitations generally. The next Part explores the theoretical
question.
A. Foreign Spending
The Citizens United majority tacked on to the end of its discussion of
the anticorruption interest a brief statement reserving the question of the
constitutionality of election spending limits imposed on foreigners. It expressed no opinion whether the “[g]overnment has a compelling interest in
181
limiting foreign influence over our political process.”
The majority likely added these three sentences in response to the dissent, which raised the ghost of World War II propagandist “Tokyo Rose” in
arguing that the logic of the majority’s approach to free speech rights would
mean that foreigners could not be limited in attempts to influence U.S. elec182
tions through campaign spending.
The dissent overstated it a bit in contending that the majority’s short discussion of the foreign spending issue “all but confesses that a categorical
183
approach to speaker identity is untenable.” After all, the majority committed to nothing regarding how it would actually resolve the constitutional
question of spending limits on foreigners, should the issue ever come before
the Court—and it might be that the Justices in the majority would not agree
on how to resolve it. But the dissent is likely right that the tenability of any
argument a future majority could make to distinguish foreign spending from
corporate spending in candidate elections is in serious question.
As framed by the majority, the question before the Court in some future
case would be whether the government has a compelling interest in “limit184
ing foreign influence over our political process.” Before turning to the
government’s possible interests in limiting foreign spending, consider how
foreign individuals or associations—or anyone else—might influence our
political process though spending on candidate elections.

181.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. The Court explained:

We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process. Cf. 2
U.S.C. § 441e (contribution and expenditure ban applied to “foreign national[s]”). Section
441b is not limited to corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or
funded predominately by foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be overbroad
even if we assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process.

Id.
182.

Id. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

183.

Id. at 948 n.51.

184. Id. at 911 (majority opinion). Of course, this question presupposes that foreign individuals and associations have First Amendment rights, and that point is not clear for certain foreign
individuals and associations. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 367 (2003).
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Money can influence the political process in two ways: electorally and
185
legislatively. Campaign spenders who pursue an electoral strategy use
money to try to convince the electorate to vote for or against a certain candidate for office. Though it is true that the candidate who spends the most
186
money on an election does not always win, having enough money is a sine
qua non to be competitive in modern campaigns. On the federal level, in
2008 the average cost to win a House seat was over $1.2 million and the
187
average Senate race cost over $6.5 million. Presidential campaigning hit
188
$1.8 billion in 2008, and each candidate in 2012 may be looking to raise at
least $1 billion. Though there is wider variation, state campaigns can also be
189
quite expensive. And of course, the fundraising needs in competitive races
190
are even higher.
Some campaign spenders pursue a legislative strategy instead of or in
addition to an electoral strategy. Under a legislative strategy, a spender’s
support for a candidate can help secure access—if not more—from grateful
elected officials.
It is easy to see why governments would enact laws barring foreign individuals, governments, and associations from spending money on candidate
elections, whether such foreigners pursue an electoral or legislative strategy.
But it is difficult to see how any of the arguments supporting a foreign
spending limit could be squared with the reasoning of the majority in Citizens United. Consider this sketch of three potential arguments in favor of

185. On the terms “electoral strategy” and “legislative strategy,” see Daniel Hays Lowenstein,
On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301,
308 (1989). Some foreigners might want to spend money on U.S. elections just for the joy of doing
so—the “consumption” value of political activity. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why is There so
Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Pers. 105 (2003). It is hard to see a foreigner’s strong
First Amendment interest in such circumstances.
186. Among prominent examples are self-financed candidates, who rarely win but can usually run a
competitive campaign through self-funding. See Anne Bauer, The Efficacy of Self-Funding a Political
Campaign, Nat’l Inst. on Money St. Pol. (June 22, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/
press/PrintReportView.phtml?r=429&PHPSESSID=6876d32e911ce6c20e13fc685e6908d4 (finding only
11 percent of self-funded candidates at state level successful in the 2000–2009 period).
187. Table 1: Cost of Winning: House and Senate Winners’ Receipts, 1998–2008, Campaign
Fin. Inst., Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.cfinst.org/congress/pdf/Table1_PostElec.pdf.
188. Richard L. Hasen, The Transformation of the Campaign Financing Regime for U.S.
Presidential Elections (Loyola Law Sch. L.A. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 200945, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1505527.
189. See Denise Roth Barber, An Overview of State Campaigns, 2007–2008, Nat’l Inst. on
Money St. Pol., tbl. 1 (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/Research/ (follow “An
Overview of State Campaigns, 2007–2008” hyperlink; then follow “Legislative Campaigns” hyperlink).
190. See See Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. Pol. 75, 82–83 (2006) (discussing much greater
competitiveness of House elections when challenger to incumbent raised over $1 million and much
less competitive when competitors raised under $500,000); Table 4: Open Seat Winners and Losers,
Senate and House, 2000–2008, Campaign Fin. Inst., Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.cfinst.org/
congress/pdf/Table4_PostElec.pdf (reporting that open House seat winners in 2008 spent an average
of $1.6 million and open Senate seat winners in 2008 spent an average of just under $7.4 million).
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such limits and how the Citizens United majority responded to each in the
191
corporate context.
1. Foreign spending could lead to corruption of elected officials. Unlike
American citizens, foreign individuals, governments, and associations are
unlikely to have allegiance to the United States. A foreign entity may even
have interests adverse to the United States, militarily, diplomatically, economically, or in some other way. Foreign individuals, governments, and
associations could spend money independently supporting candidates in the
hopes of currying favor with those candidates, getting them to take legislative positions that these foreign individuals and associations favor. At the
very least, foreigners could engage in this spending as part of a legislative
strategy to secure preferential access to elected officials and policymakers,
access which most non-spenders would not have, in the hopes of convincing
elected officials and policymakers to adopt the foreigners’ preferred legislative and policy positions.
Though these seem to be reasonable arguments in favor of a ban on foreign campaign spending, they run counter to many of the key assertions and
suppositions of the Citizens United majority. As the dissent noted, a for192
eigner spending limitation would be an identity-based restriction, which
under the majority’s view would interfere with the free speech rights of
those who would want to hear what might be said in an election about a
193
194
candidate. If more speech is always better, and if “[t]he First Amend195
ment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each,” then
it is hard to see the basis for limiting speech simply by the identity of the
speaker. In addition, the majority has declared that independent spending
196
simply cannot corrupt, and that in any case ingratiation and access are not
197
corruption.
2. Foreign spending could affect who is elected to office in the United
States. Even putting aside the possibility of corruption and the sale of
access, foreign spending aimed purely at an electoral strategy is
objectionable. In recent years, federal elections in the United States have
been marked by a rise in partisanship. The Democratic and Republican
parties fight hard in “battleground” states for the presidency, and in “swing
districts” and “purple” areas for House and Senate seats. Large amounts of
191. For each of these arguments against spending by “foreign individuals or associations,” I
leave aside the question of spending by permanent U.S. resident aliens, which presents different
questions because resident aliens may have greater allegiance and attachment to the United States. I
am including foreign governments, however.
192.

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

193.

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).

194. See id. at 911 (“[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule.”).
195. Id. at 899; cf. id. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“A speaker’s ability to persuade . . .
provides no basis for government regulation of free and open public debate on what the laws should
be.”).
196.

Id. at 909 (majority opinion).

197.

Id. at 910.
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spending on a relatively small number of races have the potential to swing
not only individual elections, but an entire house of Congress. While
Democrats and Republicans strongly disagree about which party should
control the House or Senate, I would venture that they would reach
consensus that the choice of who should be elected is one that should be
influenced by those in the United States, who have loyalty to the United
States, and not to those who live outside the U.S.’s borders.
Once again, though the arguments banning foreign campaign spending
are sensible and appealing, they seem to counter the majority opinion in
Citizens United. The idea that foreign entities should not have too much
influence over U.S. elections is a variant on antidistortion arguments.
Though the antidistortion concern expressed in relation to corporations has
been one about wealth accumulated with the corporate form that does not
have a correlation with the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas, the antidistortion concern in relation to foreign individuals and corporations is one about electoral influence by those without allegiance to, and
potentially with allegiance adverse to, the interests of the United States. Yet
to the Citizens United majority, the antidistortion interest is pernicious,
smacking of a ban on speech and censorship that threatens the very fabric of
198
American democracy. The majority’s logic applied to this context is that
we should not be afraid of more speech and that we should trust that full
disclosure will allow the American people to decide whether to support candidates who may be supported by foreign interests.
3. Foreign spending could undermine public confidence in the integrity
of the U.S. government. Since the Founding, Americans have been suspi199
cious of foreign intervention in domestic U.S. elections. To take two
recent examples, the Senate investigated reports in the 1990s that the Chinese government sought to influence the 1996 presidential election through
conduit campaign contributions benefitting Bill Clinton and congressional
200
Democrats. More recently, in 2008 opponents of President Obama raised
the possibility that then-candidate Obama had been receiving significant
foreign contributions via the internet through unitemized contributions be201
low $200. In both cases, the dispute was over the extent of foreign
198.

See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.

199. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 n.51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393
n.245 (2009)).
200. For a critical analysis of the investigation, see L. Ling-chi Wang, Beyond Identity and
Racial Politics: Asian Americans and the Campaign Fund-raising Controversy, 5 Asian L.J. 329
(1998).
201. Neil Munro, FEC Rules Leave Loopholes For Online Donation Data, Nat’l J. Online
(Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20081024_9865.php. Concern over
foreign influence in the Obama Administration extends to the fringe “Birthers” movement, which
contends despite clear evidence to the contrary that President Obama is ineligible to be president
because he was born outside the United States. See Jeff Zeleny, Persistent “Birthers” Fringe Disorients Strategists, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/politics/
05zeleny.html. In the 2010 election as well, foreign campaign influence was an issue. This time,
Democrats accused the Republican-leaning U.S. Chamber of Commerce of taking foreign money,
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influence, not over whether there was something normatively wrong with
the illegal attempt of foreign influence if it occurred.
There is at least the potential that foreign spending on U.S. elections
could undermine the integrity of the electoral process. If such spending is
significant and it is disclosed, voters could believe that foreign nationals are
improperly influencing either the outcome of U.S. elections (through pursuit
of an electoral strategy) or the legislative decisions made by elected officials
(through pursuit of a legislative strategy).
The Citizens United majority gave the back of its hand to the appearance
argument raised in the corporate context, and it is an argument that by its
terms should apply equally to spending by foreigners:
The appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to
lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is
political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a
candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to
spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the
ultimate influence over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse to take part in democratic governance
because of additional political speech made by a corporation or any other
202
speaker.

Note the majority’s unsupported empirical statement—apparently for all
types of elections and any identity of speaker—that independent spending
203
can never cause voters to “lose faith in our democracy.”
Despite the apparent application of Citizens United’s reasoning to the
question of foreign spending limits, I have little doubt that the Court would
204
uphold such limitations even though the foreign spending limit is more
severe than the corporate limitation. It is an actual ban, as there is no PAC
alternative for foreigners. As I explain in Part III, at least some of the Justices appear to care about public opinion, and the public outcry over Citizens
205
United could well pale compared to a Court decision allowing unlimited

though they offered no proof of the accusation. Eric Lichtblau, Topic of Foreign Money in U.S. Race
Hits Hustings, Oct. 9, 2010, at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/us/politics/09donate.html.
202.

130 S. Ct. at 910 (emphases added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

203. Id. This is not to say that foreign spending would necessarily cause voters to lose confidence in our democracy. The empirical evidence linking campaign rules and faith in government is
unclear at best. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 123 (2004).
But the Court apparently has closed the courts to arguments that spending can affect voter confidence in any electoral context and for any kind of speaker.
204. Heather Gerken agrees, though she seems to think that it might be enough for the government to show a “legitimate” interest to justify such limitations. Corporate America vs. The Voter:
Examining the Supreme Court’s Decision to Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in Elections:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 10 (2010) (statement of Professor
Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=46b20c68-8e8b-44ba-a20632703e280a4e.
205.

See infra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.
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foreign funds in our elections. Indeed, it was probably to forestall such an
attack after Citizens United itself that the majority added those three sentences keeping the issue open.
So how could the Court sustain a law imposing foreign spending limits
207
without overturning Citizens United? The short answer is through doctrinal incoherence. For example, the Court could state that the threat from
foreign spending influencing U.S. elections is one different in kind than that
posed by domestic corporate spending, and that when it comes to protecting
208
the country from foreign influence, the First Amendment must give way.
Or the Court could state that barring foreign influence is supported by the
same interest “in allowing governmental entities to perform their func209
tions” that justifies limitations on some political activities of government
210
employees under the Hatch Act, an interest the Court reaffirmed in Citizens United.
As the last Section showed, neither of these arguments would be convincing under a literal application of the principles of Citizens United,
because the arguments are premised on corruption, appearance of corruption, or distortion. Most likely, a majority that would make an argument
favoring foreign spending limits would simply ignore the inconsistent parts
of Citizens United and move on. In short, there is no reason we should expect a consistent application of Citizens United in the context of foreign
211
election spending.
206. The only polling on this question of which I am aware has been criticized for its methodology. See Memorandum from Joel Benenson, President, Benenson Strategy Grp., to Interested
Parties (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/33452341/Citizens-United-Survey
(“When voters learn that the ruling would make it easier for foreigners to spend money in U.S.
elections, only 13% support it, while 82% oppose it.”); Sean Parnell, More biased polling on Citizens United, Ctr. for Competitive Pol. (June 23, 2010), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/
blog/detail/more-biased-polling-on-citizens-united (criticizing methodology).
207. The Court overturning the 5–4 decision in Citizens United is not out of the question if
one of the Justices in the five-Justice majority leaves the Court. Justices Scalia and Kennedy had
been arguing against Austin since it was decided in 1986, and the Chief Justice, in his Citizens United concurrence, pointed to the continued disagreement among the Justices over the case as a reason
for not granting the case stare decisis effect. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The majority’s and concurrence’s strong reliance on prior dissenting opinions provoked a
tart response from Justice Stevens: “Under this view, it appears that the more times the Court stands
by a precedent in the face of requests to overrule it, the weaker that precedent becomes.” Id. at 939
n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 953–54 (commenting on
the fact that the majority relied on earlier opinions of Justices writing separately, not for the Court,
and observing that “those Justices were writing separately; which is to say, their position failed to
command a majority. Prior to today, this was a fact we found significant in evaluating precedents”).
208. Interestingly, most of the times that the Citizens United majority mentions the identity
issue, it couches the question in terms of “corporate identity,” rather than identity generally. See
supra note 5 (quoting the majority’s discussions of identity-based restrictions).
209.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.

210. See U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers (Letter Carriers), 413
U.S. 548 (1973). Notably, the restrictions on government employees do not prevent their voluntary
contributions directly to candidate campaigns.
211. Both Ned Foley and Sam Issacharoff rely on the cases upholding limitations on the political activities of government employees to suggest that the Court would uphold corporate
spending limitations on corporations that have contracts with the government. Corporate America
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B. Judicial Elections
Though the jurisprudential conflict between Citizens United and the
foreign spending ban is yet to come, there is already a conflict between
Citizens United and the Court’s recent jurisprudence related to money and
212
judicial elections. In 2009, the Court decided Caperton v. Massey, a case
arising out of the election of the chief justice of the West Virginia Supreme
Court.
Caperton involved the actions of a corporate CEO with a $50 million
213
lawsuit pending before the West Virginia Supreme Court. The CEO
spent considerable sums supporting the election of a candidate for chief
justice of that court. “In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory
maximum to [the judicial candidate’s] campaign committee, [the CEO]
donated almost $2.5 million to ‘And For The Sake Of The Kids,’ ” a § 527
214
corporation that ran ads targeting [the candidate’s] opponent.” The CEO
also made independent expenditures of over $500,000 supporting the
215
candidate. The candidate was elected and refused to recuse himself from

vs. The Voter: Examining the Supreme Court’s Decision to Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in
Elections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (statement of
Professor Edward B. Foley, Dir., Election Law @ Moritz, Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated
Professor in Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=071efe1d-8181-4fc9-aa097b2933910468 (“But as long as Congress does legislate with appropriate sensitivity, there should be
little doubt that Congress can regulate the campaign spending of government contractors, just like it
can do so with respect to government employees.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Still Spinning, Am.
Law., Apr. 2010, at 41, 42, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=
1202446435293&Still_Spinning&hbxlogin=1 (“But if pay-to-play is the concern, we may already
have a partial solution, and a constitutionally tested one. The Hatch Act restricts political activities
by federal employees. It was founded on the concern that public employees are both too vulnerable
and too concerned; they are both uniquely able to affect public policy and uniquely vulnerable to
extortionate demands for contributions from those who would end up being their employers. The
Hatch Act scheme could be broadened to include corporations who receive government contracts or
subsidies.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (2010)
(expanding on argument for constitutionality of spending limits on government contractors).
As much as I am sympathetic to the argument, I am much less sanguine than Foley and Issacharoff that the Roberts Court, as currently constituted, would uphold such a limitation (even with
relatively high dollar thresholds, as suggested by Foley), especially considering the broad range of
corporations with significant government contracts. The Court could well view this as a ban on the
speech of the most important and largest corporations in the United States, each of which does significant business with the federal government. Consider how Justice Scalia ended his concurring
opinion: “Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the
modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the
public debate.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The contrast with Letter Carriers is also instructive. The political limitations on government
employees in Letter Carriers did not bar employee campaign contributions or spending. Corporations with significant government contracts also do considerable business outside the government,
unlike the government employees who depend solely or primarily upon government employment for
their income. The threat of extortion of such corporations therefore seems far lower than the threat
to government employees, even though the monetary stakes are much higher.
212.

129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

213.

Id. at 2257.

214.

Id.

215.

Id.
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consideration of the corporation’s case, casting the decisive vote in the
216
corporation’s favor.
217
The Supreme Court in Caperton ruled that the CEO’s “pivotal role”
in electing the West Virginia jurist mandated the justice’s recusal on due
process grounds. “Though no[] . . . bribe or criminal influence” was involved, the Court recognized that “Justice Benjamin would nevertheless
feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get
218
him elected.”
To the Citizens United dissent, the Court in Caperton “accepted the
premise that, at least in some circumstances, independent expenditures on
candidate elections will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro quo cor219
ruption.” The dissent noted how the majority in Caperton repeatedly
described the CEO as having made “contributions” to the candidate, even
though virtually all of his money went to fund independent expenditures,
not contributions. The reason for the conflation, according the dissent, was
the recognition of spending in this context as the “functional[] equivalent”
220
of a contribution.
The Citizens United majority’s response to the dissent’s use of Caperton was curt and dismissive:
Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent.” The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s
due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton’s
holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that
221
the litigant’s political speech could be banned.

The majority’s attempt to distinguish Caperton as a recusal case is unpersuasive. The last sentence seeks to harmonize Caperton with Citizens
216.

Id. at 2258.

217.

Id. at 2262.

218.

Id.

219. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 967 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
220. Id. at 968 (“The reason the Court so thoroughly conflated expenditures and contributions, one assumes, is that it realized that some expenditures may be functionally equivalent to
contributions in the way they influence the outcome of a race, the way they are interpreted by the
candidates and the public, and the way they taint the decisions that the officeholder thereafter
takes.”); see also Symposium, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern, Transcript: Session 1: One Symptom of a Serious Problem: Caperton v. Massey, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 569, 581
(2010) (comments of Richard Hasen) (“In the majority opinion in Caperton, Justice Kennedy elides
over the distinction between contributions and expenditures and this history of campaign finance
jurisprudence.”). The dissent further explained that the Caperton decision “underscore[d]” (1) the
need for “prophylactic measures,” given the extreme difficulty in proving corruption; (2) the tendency of for-profit corporations to use “nonprofit conduits” with “misleading names;” and (3) the
fact that the Court’s decision would extend to all types of elections, including judicial elections.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (citations omitted).
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United by stating that the facts in Caperton justified only the milder remedy of recusal, and not a limit on a campaign spender’s speech. But why
do the facts in Caperton give the complaining party any remedy (in this
case, recusal) based on the CEO’s independent campaign spending? The
answer appears to be rooted in one of three possibilities, each of which
was rejected by the Court in Citizen United.
First, the Caperton majority may have accepted an antidistortion argument. The CEO’s hefty spending, making up the vast majority of the
total spending supporting the judicial candidate in the election, had a “sig222
nificant and disproportionate influence” on the candidate’s election. For
spending to be disproportionate, it has to be compared to something; it
appears that the problem here was that the CEO’s spending was disproportionate to the public’s support for his ideas. It is Austin all over again, but
this time applied to a wealthy individual with corporate interests, not a
corporation.
Second, as noted by the Citizens United dissent, the CEO’s substantial
223
spending raised the specter of corruption. It would not surprise anyone
to think that the judicial candidate would be extremely grateful to the CEO
for spending such large sums supporting his election, and could well favor
him in ruling on his case. That common sense notion seems to be the basis
of the due process recusal argument that the Court accepted in Caperton.
But it flies in the face of the Citizens United majority’s flat-out empirical
224
statement that independent spending cannot corrupt.
Finally, the CEO’s significant spending raises concerns about the appearance of corruption. Even if the candidate was completely unmoved by
the CEO’s multimillion dollar support for his judicial campaign, the public
could well be very concerned about the impartial administration of justice.
The public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary could be undermined by this spending, and the public is unlikely to draw fine legal
distinctions between contributions to candidates and contributions to independent expenditure committees. This argument runs straight into Citizens
United’s other unsupported empirical statement that “[t]he appearance of
influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy,” and independent spending which is uncoordinated with a
candidate cannot give rise to an appearance of corruption because the additional political speech simply seeks to persuade voters who have “the
225
ultimate influence over elected officials.”
What explains the Court’s incoherent treatment of the effect of independent spending in Caperton and Citizens United? We can isolate the
question more precisely by focusing on Justice Kennedy, the only Justice

222.

Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (emphasis added).

223.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

224.

Id. at 909 (majority opinion).

225.

Id. at 910.
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226

in the majority in both cases. Though we can only speculate, it may be
that Justice Kennedy views the balancing of interests in judicial elections
differently, or perhaps does not fully believe the nonnuanced empirical
statements about the effects of independent spending on corruption and the
appearance of corruption contained in Citizens United.
On the interests at stake, Justice Kennedy perhaps has come to reject
what Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in the 2002 case, Republican Party of
227
Minnesota v. White, disparagingly termed a “unilocular, an election is an
228
election, approach” to the First Amendment. The Court in White involved the question whether certain parts of a speech code for judicial
candidates violated the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy was a member
of the five-Justice majority holding that it was, but by Caperton he had
229
more fully expressed his reservations about judicial elections.
Justice Kennedy’s statements in Caperton about the importance of the
impartiality of the judiciary and the importance of public faith in that impartiality are in tension with the view of the general relationship of money
and politics that he expressed in his Citizens United majority opinion,
quoting his earlier dissent in McConnell and noting that “[f]avoritism and
influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature
of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those poli230
cies.”
If Justice Kennedy believes that the role of the judge chosen through a
judicial election is different from the role of the representative described
above, it would not be surprising for him to reach different conclusions
about the connection between money and politics in cases involving judicial elections. If so, it raises hopes that the monolithic approach mandated
226. The four Justices concurring in Justice Kennedy’s Citizens United majority opinion
dissented in Caperton; the four Citizens United dissenters joined his majority opinion in Caperton.
227.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).

228. Id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“I do not agree
with this unilocular, ‘an election is an election,’ approach. Instead, I would differentiate elections for
political offices, in which the First Amendment holds full sway, from elections designed to select
those whose office it is to administer justice without respect to persons.”).
229. Justice O’Connor was also a member of the White majority. She has since expressed
regret about her vote in that case, and has been one of the leading voices calling for judicial
elections to be abolished. Tony Mauro, Court backs N.Y. judicial-election system despite concerns, First Amendment Center (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
analysis.aspx?id=19565. It was no coincidence that Justice Stevens cited Justice O’Connor’s
statements about the problems of money in judicial elections in his Citizens United dissent.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch,
see, e.g., O’Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St. Journal, Nov. 15, 2007, p. A25; Brief for Justice
at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae 2, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and
union general treasury spending in these races.”).
230. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Kennedy added, “It
is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for,
or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.” Id.
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by Citizens United may have more flexibility than it appears on the sur231
232
face, and the rule could erode over time at least as to some elections.
The other possibility, overlapping with the first, is that Justice Kennedy
does not quite believe the flat-out empirical statements about the relationship between independent spending on the one hand and corruption and its
appearance on the other. I explore this possibility further in the final Section
of this Part.
C. Contribution Limitations
The tension between the Supreme Court’s treatment of contributions and
233
expenditures is nothing new, but the Citizens United Court puts serious
pressure on the doctrinal edifice of campaign finance law. The result of a
future challenge to campaign contribution laws will be either erosion of the
rules upholding the constitutionality of campaign contribution limitations to
candidates or, more likely, greater incoherence in judicial doctrine. As I will
show, to mask the tension, the Court appears to have deployed contradictory
evidentiary presumptions.
The Citizens United majority went out of its way to state that its opinion
did not have direct implications for the constitutionality of contribution limitation laws. Contribution limits “have been an accepted means to prevent
quid pro quo corruption,” and Citizens United “has not suggested that the
Court should reconsider whether contribution limits should be subjected to
234
rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.” The Court explained that “[t]he
Buckley Court recognized a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest in
‘the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption.’ This
followed from the Court’s concern that large contributions could be given
231. In James J. Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. (forthcoming 2011), draft available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662630, Professor Sample refers to independent spending made in the judicial elections context as a “Caperton contribution.” He praises
Justice Kennedy’s rejection of “formalism” in holding that such a “contribution” should trigger
judicial recusal. Id. Whether or not one agrees with the result in Caperton (as I do), relabeling independent spending as a “contribution” so as to reach a desired result will only increase the
incoherence of existing law. For example, it would raise questions such as when other expenditures
should doctrinally be treated as “contributions.” One defensible way to reach the result in Caperton
without resorting to incoherent terminology would be to recognize that independent spending does
have the potential to corrupt, but that outside the context of judicial elections where we are concerned especially with the public’s confidence in the fairness of the judicial process, the state’s
interest in preventing such corruption is outweighed by the considerable First Amendment costs of
limiting such spending. I suspect that is what Justice Kennedy believes, and it is unhelpful to hide
behind a “contribution” label.
232. Another question is whether the Court might view the First Amendment application to
state elections more leniently than its application to federal elections. The existing empirical evidence casts doubt on the likelihood of this scenario. Adam Winkler found in a study of federal court
decisions in a fourteen-year period that free speech laws were more likely to be upheld if passed by
the federal government, and less so if passed by state, or especially local, governments. Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 153 (2009).
233. Lowenstein et al., supra note 24, at 707–13 (describing controversy since Buckley
over the contribution-expenditure distinction).
234.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
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235

‘to secure a political quid pro quo.’ ” It further explained that “restrictions
on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to
candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements. The Buckley Court, nevertheless, sustained limits on direct contributions to protect against the
236
reality or appearance of corruption.”
On the surface the Court appears to have carved out a safe harbor for
contribution limitations to candidates. But there is tension just below the
surface. In Buckley, the Court recognized that bribery laws only dealt with
the most egregious exchanges of money for political outcomes, and that
campaign contribution limitations were justified because of the concern
about undue influence that extended far beyond concern about quid pro quo
237
corruption. Contribution limitations have been treated as prophylactic,
necessary to prevent both corruption, rather broadly defined, and preserve
voter confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.
For years, those challenging contribution limits have argued that the Supreme Court should read the definition of corruption narrowly and should
require actual evidence that contribution limitations are necessary to prevent
238
corruption or its appearance. The Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments, using deferential standards to judge the constitutionality of
239
contribution limitations, with a broad reading of the term “corruption” and
240
an extremely lax evidentiary standard.
This entire approach is now in considerable tension with the Court’s dicta in Citizens United. If access and ingratiation are not corruption and
241
corruption is really limited to quid quo pro corruption, then contribution
limitations would appear to be in serious danger of being struck down. As
Heather Gerken argued, the Citizens United dicta evincing a stingy definition of corruption could have implications well beyond imposing spending
242
limits on corporations.
But a majority of the Court is unwilling to apply its own view of corruption to contribution limitations, at least not yet. This became clear in the
Citizens United Court’s discussion of a relatively obscure Supreme Court

235.

Id. at 901 (citations omitted).

236.

Id. at 908 (citations omitted).

237.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976) (per curiam).

238. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 427–30 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
239. E.g., id. at 390–95 (majority opinion). The only significant crack in this treatment thus
far came in the Court’s fractured decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), striking down
Vermont’s contribution limits as unconstitutionally low, but the controlling opinion there did not
purport to alter the Court’s fundamental approach to contribution limitations.
240. See Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That
Wouldn’t Leave,” 17 Const. Comment. 483, 491–96 (2000).
241.

See supra notes 104, 111 and accompanying text.

242. Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United, Am. Prospect (Jan. 22,
2010), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_real_problem_with_citizens_united.
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243

campaign finance case, NRWC. In Citizens United, the Court distinguished NRWC, which held that a nonprofit corporation could be limited in
terms of whom it could solicit to contribute to its PAC. As Citizens United
explained, the Court in NRWC, relying upon Bellotti footnote 26, “did say
there is a ‘sufficient’ governmental interest in ‘ensur[ing] that substantial
aggregations of wealth amassed’ by corporations would not ‘be used to in244
cur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions.’ ”
Taking the rest of Citizens United seriously, the NRWC dicta appeared to
be in serious danger. Under the Citizens United framework, it is hard to see
the corruption potential of even substantial aggregations of wealth amassed
by corporations contributed to PACs. At least as to independent spending by
such PACs, the Court has flatly said that it cannot create political debts.
Moreover, the group at issue in NRWC was a nonprofit corporation, which
had no substantial aggregations of wealth. So how could NRWC survive Citizens United?
The Court punted on this issue. It stated that NRWC has “little relevance
here” because the case “involved contribution limits, which unlike limits on
independent expenditures have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro
245
quo corruption.”
The brief aside on NRWC shows the Court’s apparent strategy: keep
the evidentiary standard on proving corruption low and the definition of
corruption loose when it comes to considering the constitutionality of contribution limitations, but keep the evidentiary standard impossibly high
and the definition of corruption extremely narrow when it comes to considering the constitutionality of spending limitations. This kind of
evidentiary stacking-the-deck allows the Court to maintain the contribution-expenditure dichotomy, and it does so without the Court having to
confront the more difficult doctrinal questions, like whether spending limits could ever be justified using strict scrutiny under the looser definition
of corruption applied in the contribution limits cases.
Incoherent? Of course; but it is sustainable so long as the Court is willing to ignore gaps in logic and inconsistencies in its treatment of similar
issues as it decides future campaign finance cases.

243. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). The case gets little treatment
in the two leading casebooks. Of the 280 pages on campaign finance in the Lowenstein, Hasen, and
Tokaji casebook, NRWC is discussed on three pages (795, 796, and 844). Lowenstein et al., supra note 24, at 795–96, 844. The case does not appear in the index of Samuel Issacharoff et al.,
The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process (3d ed. 2007).
244.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207–08).

245. Id. (citations omitted). The Court further explained that “Citizens United has not made
direct contributions to candidates and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether
contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. Moreover, the
Court, in explaining Buckley’s holding that contribution limitations could be imposed to prevent
quid pro quo corruption, explained that “restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements. The Buckley
Court, nevertheless, sustained limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or
appearance of corruption.” Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
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III. Doctrinal Incoherence, Political Coherence?
The present and likely future incoherence of campaign finance doctrine
surely was not lost on the Citizens United majority. Justice Stevens wrote in
his dissent of the Court’s inconsistent treatment of Bellotti footnote 26,
which left open the question whether limits on independent corporate spending could be justified on grounds of preventing quid pro quo corruption. He
wrote that the Court was in “the strange position of trying to elevate Bellotti
to canonical status, while simultaneously disparaging a critical piece of its
analysis as unsupported and irreconcilable with Buckley. Bellotti, apparently,
246
is both the font of all wisdom and internally incoherent.” The majority had
no response to this point.
Incoherence is nothing new in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
decisions, and the post-Citizens United jurisprudence is not necessarily
more incoherent than the pre-Citizens United jurisprudence. Before Citizens
United, of course, Austin lived uncomfortably with Bellotti. Moreover, the
Court’s application of Austin itself was internally incoherent. For example,
the antidistortion rationale was premised upon limiting the influence of
large amounts of wealth accumulated with the corporate form. Yet in
McConnell, the Supreme Court upheld the extension of Austin to labor unions without so much as a word of recognition that unions do not
accumulate wealth in the same way as corporations do, much less a justifi247
cation for the extension.
While no one besides the Justices can say for sure why almost all of
them have been willing to sustain various kinds of incoherence in campaign
248
finance jurisprudence for so many years, one promising possibility is that
Justices have tempered their legal theories with a political sensibility. Leaving to one side the question whether the Supreme Court generally follows
249
public opinion, the pattern in the campaign finance field has been one of
compromise that appears to, if not track the center of public thinking on
campaign finance questions, at least avoid the extremes. Thus, the Court’s
equal treatment of corporate and labor union campaign spending in McConnell echoed the parallel treatment of these groups by Congress since the
1940s. One of the major talking points against the proposed DISCLOSE
250
Act, which seeks to increase certain disclosure requirements and limit
spending by certain corporations that are foreign, government contractors,
or recipients of recent financial “bailouts,” is that it treats labor unions more

246. Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 925 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“We have also had the benefit of a comprehensive dissent that has helped
ensure that the Court has considered all the relevant issues.”).
247.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

248. Justice Thomas appears to be the lone exception among current Justices. See Hasen,
supra note 142.
249. See generally Barry Friedman, The Will of the People (2009); Public Opinion
and Constitutional Controversy (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
250.

S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
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251

favorably than corporations. In addition, my understanding as to why labor
unions did not raise the argument in McConnell that Austin distortion did not
apply to unions was a fear that if the Court agreed, but kept the corporate
spending limits in place, Congress would be pressured to remove the corporate spending limits legislatively because of this lack of parity. The Court’s
parallel treatment of labor unions and corporations was legally incoherent but
politically coherent.
Similarly, the exemption from the PAC requirement for media corporations engaged in bona fide media activities was a constant source of
complaint of incoherence by opponents of the Austin rule. The Citizens
252
United dissent described it as a Catch-22 problem for Austin supporters.
During the Austin era, the Court’s inconsistent treatment of media corpora253
tions was arguably legally incoherent (though the point is debatable ) but
politically coherent: neither Congress nor the public would support spending limitations on media corporations engaged in media activities, but they
would support limits on non-media corporations’ election-related spending.
254
To make the point more generally, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence has been conducted on a background of ideological struggle,
bounded at its extremes by public opinion. Since the 1970s the campaign
finance reform proponents and opponents have been engaged in a battle to
win the hearts of the Supreme Court Justices. The reformers, hearkening
back to Watergate, tell a story about politicians tempted to exchange dollars
for political favors and a public growing ever more cynical about the integrity of government, as each new campaign finance scandal hits the
newspapers, airwaves, and blogs. They also focus on the very large amounts
of money flowing into the system, particularly from groups that can plausibly be labeled “special interests.” The opponents paint campaign finance
regulation as a big incumbent protection racket, in which incumbent politicians enact election laws to benefit themselves and insulate themselves from

251. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Disclosed Partisanship, Nat’l Rev., June 7, 2010, at 26, 27,
available at http://article.nationalreview.com/434739/disclosed-partisanship/bradley-a-smith?page=1
(“DISCLOSE’s partisanship is apparent in its different treatment of corporations and unions.”).
252.

Justice Stevens acknowledges this Catch-22:

Under the majority’s view, the legislature is thus damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. If
the legislature gives media corporations an exemption from electioneering regulations that apply to other corporations, it violates the newly minted First Amendment rule against identitybased distinctions. If the legislature does not give media corporations an exemption, it violates
the First Amendment rights of the press. The only way out of this invented bind: no regulations
whatsoever.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 976 n.75 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. The point is debatable if one recognizes the different role media corporations play in
society. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
254. I describe the competing stories in historical terms in Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives
of Buckley v. Valeo, in First Amendment Stories (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman,
eds.) (forthcoming 2010), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1593253.
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competition and criticism. To these opponents, campaign finance regulation
is the modern day equivalent of the Alien and Sedition Acts.
On the Court, thus far the liberals have taken the reform side and con255
servatives have taken the opponents’ side. But neither side has adopted the
more extreme vision of campaign finance jurisprudence proposed by either
the reformers or the opponents. Though a few of the liberal Justices have
entertained the notion that some individual spending limits beyond corpo256
rate spending limits could be constitutional, they have not had to face that
257
question in a case in which the issue mattered. It might not be legally coherent to say that corporations may be limited in their spending but wealthy
individuals may not be, but the liberals on the Court had been content with
their half a loaf.
Similarly, whether the conservatives on the Roberts Court now would be
willing to overrule Buckley and allow unlimited contributions directly to
candidates is seriously questionable, despite the language of Citizens United
that gives the Court a way to reach that result if it chooses to do so. A Supreme Court majority likely would be wary of recognizing an individual
First Amendment right to give multimillion dollar contributions directly to
federal candidates and officeholders. Such recognition would certainly reignite public ire at the Court, especially after the next inevitable campaign
finance scandal.
If 80% of the public “oppose[s] the recent ruling by the Supreme Court
that says corporations and unions can spend as much money as they want to
258
help political candidates win elections,” how many people would welcome

255. It is not at all clear that Justice Kagan will side with the other liberals on the campaign
finance issue. See Richard L. Hasen, The Big Ban Theory, Slate (May 24, 2010, 12:16 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2254830/ (describing position of then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan on
campaign finance reform issues).
256.
in part).

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 963 n.65 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting

257. In Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240–44 (2006), the Court, applying Buckley, refused
to reconsider the unconstitutionality of candidate spending limits.
258. ABC News/Washington Post Poll Results, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/images/
PollingUnit/1102a6Trend.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). Significantly, the Court’s ruling in Citizens United was opposed by 76% of Republicans polled and 73% of conservatives. Gary Langer, In
Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public Dissents, ABC News (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00
AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenumbers/2010/02/in-supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-financethe-public-dissents.html. Two other polls reached similar, though not quite as strong, results. News
Release, The Pew Research Ctr. For The People & The Press, Midterm Election Challenges for Both
Parties, 31 (Feb 12, 2010), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/589.pdf (68% disapproval
of Citizens United decision compared to 17% approval); Fox News Poll: Opinion Dynamics, Fox
News (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/020410_Obama-Washington_
web.pdf (report which specifically mentioned the First Amendment rights of corporations found the
Citizens United decision opposed by 53% of respondents, with 27% approving). The only poll of
which I am aware to reach a somewhat contrary result, conducted for the Center for Competitive
Politics, asked the question, “Do you believe that the government should have been able to prevent
Citizens United, an incorporated nonprofit advocacy group, from making its movie available through
video-on-demand technology?” Citizens United poll shows broad support for free political speech,
Ctr. for Competitive Pol. (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/20100304_
CCPpoll03042010.pdf (19% said yes and just over 51% said no). The poll did not ask about a PAC
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a ruling allowing direct corporate contributions to candidates? A Gallup poll
conducted right after the Court decided Citizens United found that although
a majority of Americans believed that giving campaign contributions is a
form of free speech and that the corporations, labor unions, and others
should be subject to the same campaign finance rules as individuals, 76% of
respondents supported corporate and labor union contribution limits, and
259
61% supported individual contribution limits. In the same poll, a majority
of Americans thought it was more important to limit campaign donations
260
than to protect free speech rights.
Although these findings would likely give the Justices considerable
pause before overturning core campaign contribution limitations, it does not
mean that the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence is likely to remain
stagnant. Campaign finance issues are barely understood by the public and
261
generally not a national priority. Only extreme opinions like Citizens
United are likely to get the public’s attention. Assuming this same fiveJustice majority stays on the Court, the Justices will be presented with many
262
less-salient ways to loosen the campaign finance rules. However, complete
deregulation, along the lines proposed by Justice Thomas, would take political courage to issue additional politically unpopular decisions. It is not clear
that there are five Justices willing to spend considerable goodwill and political capital on such a strategy.
If my main supposition is correct—that the Court’s jurisprudence will
vary within a wide range, but is likely constrained at its edges more by political considerations than legal coherence—this presents a challenge for
lawyers arguing before the federal courts. Lawyers generally argue doctrine,
not politics, and a Supreme Court Justice or federal judge can seize on an
requirement imposed on corporations generally. Id. Nor did its question explain that Citizens United
could have used its PAC to pay for making its movie available. Id.
259. Lydia Saad, Public Agrees With Court: Campaign Money Is “Free Speech,” Gallup,
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/public-agrees-court-campaign-money-freespeech.aspx.
260.

Id. (52 percent to 41 percent).

261. See David M. Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus Reality,
7 Indep. Rev. 207, 210, 212 (2002), available at http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/primo/
primoindrev.pdf.
262. A federal district court recently rejected the Republican National Committee’s “as applied” challenge to the BCRA’s soft money rules. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d
150 (D.D.C. 2010) (three-judge court). The district court held the claims indistinguishable from the
ones rejected in McConnell, but added the following observation:
In due course, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to clarify or refine this aspect of
McConnell as the Court sees fit, and to consider the RNC’s challenge to § 323(a) in light of the
RNC’s pledge to no longer grant preferential access to soft-money contributors. As a lower
court, however, we do not believe we possess authority to clarify or refine McConnell in the
fashion advocated by the RNC, or to otherwise get ahead of the Supreme Court.

Id. at 160. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court decision. Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas would have heard the
case. Id. If the RNC refiles its case as a straightforward facial challenge to McConnell’s soft money
holding, I would be unsurprised it the Court took the case and then either overturned McConnell or
whittled it away first, along the lines of WRTL II.
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inconsistency within campaign finance doctrines to reject a doctrinal argument. Moreover, if Supreme Court doctrine is incoherent, lower court judges
263
may be at a loss as to how to apply it, and the judges’ general political
views about the wisdom of the reform or opponent’s story about campaign
finance regulation could subconsciously sway campaign finance decisions.
As John Matsusaka and I note in another context, the more room there is in
judicial doctrine for judgment calls, the more likely it is that a judge’s ideo264
logical views color the doctrinal analysis.
In short, in campaign finance law there remains a lot of play in the joints
even as the Supreme Court moves in a decidedly deregulationist direction.
265
My worst fears of a completely deregulated campaign finance system may
not be realized, so long as the Justices care about what the public thinks, to
some extent.
Conclusion
In her commentary on the Supreme Court’s deferential decision in
266
McConnell v. FEC, Lillian BeVier was feeling “quite thoroughly vanquished” by the Court’s opinion, which stood at odds with her scholarly
267
writing supporting deregulation. The question now is what supporters of
reasonable campaign finance regulation can contribute to the debate in light
of Citizens United. My contribution in this Article has been to demonstrate
that the Citizens United majority opinion is far less pure and coherent than
its packaging suggests. This recognition has both practical and theoretical
consequences. Practically, it provides some guidelines for reformers to whittle down the decision through exposing incoherence that can move doctrine
more favorably back toward the center. Theoretically, it illustrates the political context in which the Court works and the likely limits of the Court’s
doctrinal shifts. It also suggests that public pressure on the Supreme Court
268
for unpopular decisions, as currently led by President Obama, may ultimately influence the Court not to move to full and total deregulation of the
campaign finance system.
263. In Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355–58 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Easterbrook, issuing a
separate opinion dubitante, lamented the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on its campaign
finance disclosure jurisprudence. After reviewing the contradictory caselaw, he remarked, “How can
legislators or the judges of other courts determine what is apt to tip the balance?” Id. at 357 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante). Judge Easterbrook wrote before Citizens United, and Doe v. Reed clarified the
general constitutionality of campaign finance disclosure regimes.
264. John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject
Rule, 9 Election L.J. 399 (2010).
265. See Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57
S.C. L. Rev. 669 (2006).
266.

540 U.S. 93 (2003).

267. See Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley’s First Amendment, 3
Election L.J. 127, 127 (2004).
268. On President Obama’s attacks on the Court as part of a political strategy, see Richard L.
Hasen, Scalia’s Retirement Party, Slate (Apr. 12, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/
2250579/.
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Other than that, supporters of campaign finance reform may have to wait
another generation and a change in Supreme Court personnel for the opportunity to overturn Citizens United, just as deregulationists have fought
Austin at every opportunity since 1990. If the opportunity comes to overturn
Citizens United, I do not expect the decision to be a model of coherence.
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